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INTRODUCTION 
This study describes and discusses cultural changes that have taken 
place in rural North Korea under Communism, giving special attention to 
social changes. What notable changes have actually occurred? To what 
extent does the traditional culture survive, overtly and covertly, and what 
effects has it had in shaping modern conditions? To what degree has the 
modern population accepted Communist ideology? What, if any, have been 
the problems of adjustment to Communist life? These are some of the 
questions to which this study is addressed. 
The division of the Korean peninsula following World War I1 resulted in 
the replacement of a single, homogeneous sociocultural system by two 
different systems, Communism in the northern half and anti-Communist 
capitalism in the south. Communism in North Korea is now more than a 
generation old, and so far the new system has suffered no serious setback on 
its way toward construction of an "ideal society." Students of North Korean 
Communism generally agree that after a quarter of a century of intensive 
experimentation, North Korea has emerged as one of the most radically 
changed and, at the same time, one of the most highly disciplined states in 
the world. Scholars have often asserted that fundamental, revolutionary 
changes have taken place in almost every aspect of the culture of North 
Korea. The precise nature of these changes is often not made clear or 
explicit, however, especially in matters of social relationships. 
Certain changes that occurred after the introduction of Communism, 
such as the abolition of private ownership of means of producing goods, are 
well known to the rest of the world. This change alone would seriously 
weaken the foundation of the traditional society, which was largely based 
upon kinship. Similarly, collectivization of agricultural land alone would 
bring great changes, particularly in the realm of kinship. So also would 
mechanization of agriculture. We may reasonably assume that, sparked by 
economic and technological changes such as those cited above, a great many 
alterations occurred in the social order in general. We know, of course, that 
certain social changes were consciously planned. We may safely assume that 
many other changes have evolved without conscious planning - at least 
without farsighted planning - as the result of the interaction of old and new 
traits. This study thus necessarily concerns itseIf with economic de- 
velopments, but its goals are broader. I intend to investigate and interpret 
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planned and unplanned cultural losses, gains, survivals, and adaptations, 
giving special emphasis to social changes, the subject about which our 
knowledge appears to be the smallest. 
In order to discern what changes have actually been made in North 
Korea and to gain an understanding of the circumstances that have led to 
unplanned changes, I shall first describe traditional Korean culture and then 
turn to an examination of the contemporary culture of North Korea. These 
ethnographic data will help us to see how traditional elements and new traits 
have interacted. Some of the major features of Korean social organization 
that will be examined along the lines discussed above are described briefly in 
the following paragraph. 
Traditional Korean society was familistic or kin-based. Kinship had 
been a dominant factor in all aspects of its social organization. Lineage 
members maintained strong solidarity, and when they shared an ancestor of 
historic prominence, solidarity was especially strong. Solidarity and 
integration of kin groups was supported particularly by property held in 
common. The Korean system of kinship relations had been strongly 
influenced by Chinese Confucianism. Kin terms were mainly derived from 
China, and the essence of Korean ancestor worship was prescribed by the 
Confucian ethical code. In traditional Korea, however, Confucianism was not 
the same as in China. Marked differences developed in the process of 
interaction with the native Korean culture. For example, in Korea the father- 
son relationship was the most highly valued among the "five human 
relationships," In China, however, all five relationships were ideally 
balanced, and, accordingly, the father-son relationship did not have pre- 
eminence over others. The emphasis in Korea on the father-son relationship 
and the allied development of exclusive lineages are obviously incompatible 
with a Communist revolution. One might expect, therefore, that under 
Communism these Confucian-derived elements would be either eliminated or 
substantially modified. 
My study attempts to shed light on such questions regarding changes in 
social organization as are stated or implied in the preceding paragraph. In 
doing so, it deals mainly with rural North Korea, where I believe the 
traditional culture of pre-modern Korea was better preserved than in urban 
areas. Since I, a South Korean, could not conduct field research in North 
Korea, my study has depended principally upon information gathered from 
former North Korean Communists, people who once lived in North Korea 
under Communism, and foreigners who have visited North Korea. Use was 
also made of documents. Thus research techniques employed in gathering 
information were a combination of interviews and library research. 
The primary and probably most valuable source of information was 
informants who had lived in North Korea as Communists for many years. In 
addition to the millions of refugees who left North Korea in the period 
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between the beginning of Communism and the end of the Korean War, 
hundreds of people later left for various reasons and now live in South Korea. 
These people may be divided into two groups: voluntary deserters and North 
Korean intelligence agents who subsequently surrendered to or were caught 
by South Korean governmental authorities and were allowed to live in South 
Korea after "rehabilitation." I conducted extensive interviews with five such 
informants during three and one-half months of field research in Seoul, 
Korea, during the summer of 1972. Among the five informants, all of whom 
were male, two were voluntary deserters and three were formerly North 
Korean intelligence agents. All had been citizens of North Korea for many 
years until their defection, which occurred between 1961 and 1969. At the 
time of their interviews, the informants ranged in age from 37 to 50 years and 
varied in familial social status, education, and occupation. One had a college 
degree and another was graduated from a technical school of junior college 
level. The others had received less formal education. Their occupations had 
been schoolteacher, military service (two, as officers), farm security agent, 
and party functionary. Since all left their families behind in North Korea, the 
identity of these informants is kept anonymous here to avoid the possibility of 
any punitive action against their relatives. 
In addition to the information given by these five informants, I benefited 
from an interview with one of the latest arrivals from North Korea, an 
intelligence agent who was arrested in 1972 after six months of underground 
activity. This informant was born in Seoul, where his parents still reside. He 
was able to provide information concerning the most recent trends in North 
Korea. 
Selection of these informants was made on the basis of their knowledge 
of the North Korean countryside and their availability. One informant 
provided valuable assistance in arranging for interviews with others. Since he 
is knowledgeable about the personal backgrounds of many ex-North 
Koreans, his advice was a key in the selection of other informants. Interviews 
took place mostly in hotel rooms and, to a lesser degree, in informants' 
homes or at  their places of work. 
Secondary sources used in this study are documents available in the 
United States, Korea, and Japan. Most of the works in question were 
published in North Korea and either were released by North Korean 
Communist officials or reached the outside world through other channels. 
Some publications that were used are observations of foreign visitors to North 
Korea. The most inportant source of the documents was the North Korean 
collection in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., which is very 
extensive. Other sources include collections in the Tenri University Library, 
Tenri City, Japan, the Institute of Oriental Culture of Tokyo University, the 
Institute of Developing Economics, Tokyo, the Diet Library of Japan, 
Tokyo, and the Asiatic Research Center of Korea University, Seoul. 
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A word of caution about my sources of information is useful. Since 
actual field work in North Korea was impossible, it was also impossible to 
verify firmly all of the information given here. The informants tended to 
identify themselves as anti-Communists, apparently to avoid any possible 
suspicion of their continuing loyalty to Communism. By serving as 
informants, they wished to express their loyalty to the South Korean 
government, which they felt had saved their lives. The nature of this study, 
however, probably minimizes the possible bias of the informants. The 
interviews focused on factual ethnographic information on contemporary 
North Korea and gave little attention to ideological opinions, in which bias 
might be expected to be strong. The main concerns of the interviews were the 
things and events which the informants had seen and experienced while in 
North Korea, and efforts were made to reduce or identify bias or 
exaggeration. When information seemed questionable, attempts were made 
to verify or correct it by asking other informants. Except for some unique 
personal experiences, however, the data given by the informants showed little 
difference or variety in local customs throughout North Korea under 
Communism. Hardly any fundamental disagreements were found in the 
information gathered from informants of different backgrounds. A high 
degree of cultural uniformity seems to exist in North Korea. 
Obviously, North Korean official publications have built-in biases, since 
their primary objectives are to disseminate information and to educate the 
people along Communist lines. These publications show no particular 
interest in reporting what is; rather, they emphasize what should be and what 
ought to be done. In order to win the support of the people, the publications 
give emphasis to accounts of how well the system works, rather than focusing 
on the way in which it operates. Some ethnographic studies have been made 
by official North Korean ethnologists (e.g., Hwang et al. 1960), but even in 
these studies emphasis has been given to newly-emerged socialist elements of 
culture and to what is yet to be changed, that is, to the remnants of the 
traditional "feudal" society. These ethnological studies provide gov- 
ernmental authorities with guidance for policy-making. When the 
Communist ethnologists conduct field research on rural society, they tend to 
choose either the most advanced cooperative farm available or the most 
backward one. Describing one extreme, they vaunt the "superiority" of the 
socialist system of cooperative economy, and in describing the other extreme 
they discern problems that remain to be solved. Of course, neither extreme is 
modal or typical of contemporary rural North Korean society. When we put 
information derived from Communist ethnological studies into the broad 
perspective of the full sociocultural system of North Korea, however, it can be 
properly understood. Let us suppose, for example, that these accounts consist 
of an attack on the "rain-calling" ceremony. In the past, it was common 
practice for the peasants to perform this rite when droughts occurred. Their 
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farming lacked adequate irrigation and was largely dependent upon rain, 
which they regarded as being under the control of supernatural beings. 
Although it is claimed by North Korean propaganda that farmers are no 
longer troubled by droughts because of the progress made in the 
development of irrigation systems, the attack on the rain-calling ceremony 
leads us to believe that this idea of supernaturalism is still alive. This 
interpretation does not necessarily mean that rain-calling actually or often 
happens in rural North Korea, but simply that the belief probably remains. 
Thus the information collected from the North Korean sources used in 
this study may not be entirely accurate. It  is quite possible that the 
Communist authorities have exaggerated the effectiveness of their system. 
Those who have visited North Korea are primarily sympathizers with the 
regime, whose travelogues would hardly be objective. Every effort has been 
made, however, to verify information by use of different sources. Interviews 
were directed largely toward information drawn from my preliminary library 
research. As noted earlier, no fundamental disagreement was found among 
the different sources. To some extent, it may be said that, in one way or 
another, every piece of information from these sources does reflect conditions 
in North Korea. 
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